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I. INTRODUCTION
Coal, a primary energy source,' is presently fueling the fires of debate
in Virginia. The controversy has arisen over a plan developed by private
investors to construct a coal slurry pipeline.2 The pipeline, as proposed,
1. More than 50% of the electricity produced in the United States is generated from coal.
H.R. REP. No. 64, pt. 1, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1983).
2. For discussions of the diverse issues related to coal slurry pipelines, see generally John-
son & Schneider, Coal Slurry Pipelines: An Economic and Political Dilemma, 48 I.C.C.
PRAC. J. 24 (1980); Webber, Coal Slurry Pipelines Are Ready, Willing, and Unable to Get
There, 11 ST. MARY'S L.J. 765 (1980); Comment, Coal Slurry Pipelines and Railroad Cross-
ings: Court Decisions Favor the Pipeline Sponsors, 18 Hous. L. REv. 1075 (1981) [hereinaf-
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would transport between five and twenty-five million tons of coal annu-
ally' from southwest Virginia to the Tidewater area.4 The coal would be
pulverized and combined in a fifty percent mixture with water. Once the
coal reaches its destination, the water would be extracted by centrifuge,
leaving the coal ready for use.5
Two legal obstacles have been raised to the development of such a
pipeline. The first involves the granting of eminent domain powers to the
slurry pipeline company. The second involves possible impairment of ex-
isting water rights. This note will discuss both of these aspects of the coal
slurry debate.
Most domestic coal is transported by rail at noncompetitive rates;6 it is
considered the cream of the railroads' business.7 Proponents see coal
slurry pipelines as an innovative alternative to skyrocketing rail freight
costs, and the experiences of the two coal pipelines which have operated
successfully in the United States would seem to substantiate this claim."
Moreover, slurry advocates contend that breaking the railroads' monop-
ter cited as Comment, Coal Slurry and Railroad Crossings]; Comment, Do State Restric-
tions on Water Use by Slurry Pipelines Violate the Commerce Clause?, 53 U. COLO. L. REV.
655 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Comment, State Restrictions].
3. K. Drummond, Geologist for Norfolk and Western Railway, Remarks to the Virginia
Council on the Environment 2 (Nov. 2, 1981) (unpublished manuscript).
4. The three favored alternative routes are: (1) Grundy to Portsmouth, (2) Big Stone Gap
to Portsmouth, and (3) Pound to Portsmouth. See 0. Yucel, Coal Slurry Pipelines in Vir-
ginia; A Preliminary Study 1-3 (Oct. 8, 1981) (available through the Virginia Center for Coal
and Energy Research, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg,
Virginia).
5. Comment, Coal Slurry Pipelines: A Transportation Alternative for North Dakota
Coal?, 53 N.D.L. REV. 449, 450 (1977).
6. H.R. RaP. No. 64, supra note 1, at 13. Deregulation of rail rates under the Staggers Act
essentially allows railroad companies to use their own discretion in setting shipping charges.
A shipper who complains about rail rates must demonstrate that the rates exceed the
amount it would cost him to build his own railroad for his exclusive use.
7. Comment, An Analysis of Technical and Legal Issues Raised by the Development of
Coal Slurry Pipelines, 13 Hous. L. REv. 528, 537 (1976).
8. The 108-mile Ohio pipeline, built in 1957 in response to high railroad rates, was deacti-
vated in 1963 when the advent of the unit train made coal transportation by rail more eco-
nomical than by pipeline. In 1957 the railroad rate increased from $2.63 to $3.47 per ton; by
1963, the rate had been reduced to $1.88 per ton. GOVERNOR'S ENERGY ADVISORY COUNCIL,
STATE OF TEXAS, COAL AND LIGNITE: MINING, TRANSPORTATION, AND UTILIZATION NEEDS FOR
TExAS, REP. No. 77-003, at 81 (1977), cited in Webber, supra note 2, at 766 n.9. The typical
unit train consists of six locomotives pulling approximately 100 permanently-coupled hop-
per cars which are equipped with rotary couplers which permit emptying without uncou-
pling. By shuttling continuously between the coal producing area and the shippers' coal
terminal, a unit train can haul coal for 40% less than conventional rail carriage. Webber,
supra note 2, at 768-69. In contrast, the 273-mile Black Mesa pipeline, built in 1970 by the
Southern Pacific Railroad because the rugged Arizona terrain prevented use of the unit
train, continues to operate with relatively few problems. Johnson & Schneider, supra note 2,
at 29.
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oly on coal transportation will further stimulate the coal industry9 and
lower the rates consumers pay for electricity." Opponents argue that a
coal slurry pipeline would cripple recent efforts to revitalize the railroad
industry."
Since the most vehement opposition to coal pipelines comes from the
railroads that own or control the rights of way through which the pipe-
lines must pass, supporters advocate granting eminent domain powers to
coal pipeline companies. At least ten states have such statutes,1 2 and sim-
ilar legislation was introduced in the 98th Congress s and in both the
1983 and the 1984 Virginia General Assembly.14 The railroad industry ar-
gues that slurry companies should not have eminent domain powers be-
cause the operation of the pipelines will serve private rather than public
9. Richmond Times-Dispatch, July 23, 1983, at B4, cal. 5.
10. SLURRY TRANSPORT ASSOCIATIONS, SLURRY TRANSPORT REPORT 1-2 (1979), cited in
Comment, Coal Slurry and Railroad Crossings, supra note 2, at 1077 n.21.
11. Johnson & Schneider, supra note 2, at 25 (quoting remarks made by William H.
Dempsey, President, Association of American Railroads).
12. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 361.08 (Supp. 1982); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:721-24 (West
Supp. 1982); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 69-13-101 to -104 (1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-190 (1982);
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 49-19-01, 49-19-12 (1978); Onio REV. CODE ANN. § 1723.01 (Baldwin
1979); OKLA. STAT. tit.*27, §§ 7.1-.11 (Supp. 1982); Tsx. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 111.301-
.305 (Vernon 1978); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-1 (1977); W. VA. CODE § 54-1-2 (1979).
13. See S. 267, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) and H.R. 1010, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
H.R. 1010 was defeated by a 182-235 vote on September 27, 1983. House Decisively Rejects
Coal Slurry Bill, 42 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 2034 (1983). If the federal legislation had passed,
it might have preempted Virginia's existing ban on eminent domain for coal pipelines as set
out in VA. CODE ANN. § 56-49 (Repl. Vol. 1981). The amended Senate version of the bill
would not have preempted state laws unless those laws discriminated against slurry pipe-
lines. Rothman, Public Works Panel Approves Coal Slurry Bill, 41 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP.
1173 (1983).
14. In response to the proposed construction of a 400-mile pipeline from Southwest Vir-
ginia to Hampton Roads, two bills were introduced in the 1983 General Assembly to give
coal pipelines eminent domain powers. H.B. 262, 1983 Va. Gen. Assem. would have estab-
lished the Virginia Coal Pipeline Act, giving coal slurry pipelines the power to obtain rights
of way through eminent domain for construction, operation, and maintenence of the pipe-
line, H.B. 514, 1983 Va. Gen. Assem. would have amended VA. CODE ANN. § 56-49 (Repl.
Vol. 1981), striking the Code's present language which specifically forbids such use of emi-
nent domain. Both bills were "passed by indefinitely" by the House of Delegates Committee
on Corporations, Insurance and Banking and were never considered by the full Assembly.
1983 HousE JOURNAL 1299. The General Assembly did, however, pass a resolution, H.J. Res.
117, calling for a joint committee to study the coal slurry issue. 1983 VA. ACTS 1296-97.
The 1984 General Assembly considered a bill, H.B. 479, 1984 Va. Gen. Assem., to allow
coal slurry development, but the bill was defeated in committee. 1984 HOUSE JOURNAL
Similar in scope to the legislation considered in 1983, the Bill granted coal pipeline compa-
nies the power of eminent domain, but placed three limitations on exercise of the power.
Eminent domain could be used only to acquire rights of way on which to construct and
operate a coal pipeline. The interest acquired would be an easement rather than fee simple
ownership. Eminent domain, finally, could not be used to obtain water rights. The 1984 bill
also contained more comprehensive environmental safeguards than did prior proposed legis-
lation. H.B. 479, 1984 Va. Gen. Assem.
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
interests. Meeting the opposition's challenge is crucial to the success of
coal slurry pipeline development. Exercising eminent domain powers is
not valid unless it is for the public use,15 but public use is a nebulous
concept. Assessing the public use quotient of coal slurry pipelines is at
the center of the current controversy.
The first section of this note will examine in detail the public use re-
quirement of eminent domain law, focusing on the public use standard in
Virginia as it would be applied to a coal slurry pipeline. Other aspects of
eminent domain, such as the definition of a "taking," the determination
of compensation, and statutory procedure, will not be discussed.
The second half of this note will focus on water rights. The coal slurry
pipeline is expected to require the transfer of at least 1.4 billion gallons of
water annually from water basins within southwest Virginia."' The propo-
nents of the pipeline have not identified the precise water sources antici-
pated; however, the most likely sources of water are surface water from
streams and groundwater supplies. 17 Environmentalists are uncertain
whether water supplies in southwest Virginia can accommodate the pipe-
line as well as other water uses.18 However, even if sufficient resources
exist, water supply presents formidable legal obstacles to the implementa-
tion and operation of the coal slurry pipelines.
In Virginia, surface water is allocated according to the common law ri-
parian doctrine.19 This doctrine exposes a heavy water user to private
suits brought by other riparian owners20 and prohibits the interbasin
transfer of water.2 Groundwater rights are also governed by common law,
15. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; VA. CONST. art. I, §§ 6, 11.
16. K. Drummond, supra note 3, at 2. A coal slurry solution is comprised of equal
amounts of water and ground coal. The coal is pumped through a pipeline to its destination
which is usually an electrical plant. At the plant the coal is dewatered by centrifuge, and
burned. II Virginia Society of Professional Engineers, Virginia Coal Transportation Study
39 (July 1983) [hereinafter cited as Transportation Study]. The slurry wastewater would
probably be introduced into water sources within the Tidewater area. Pipeline proponents
have not decided upon a method of purification or disposal. Id. at 47.
17. Clear water is not the only source of water for a coal slurry pipeline. Sewage water
also may be used. 0. Yucel, supra note 4, at 5-8. However surface water and groundwater
are the most likely sources. The cost of purifying wastewater is prohibitive. K. Drummond,
supra note 3, at 2-3.
18. Detailed studies of the impact of a pipeline on water supplies in southwest Virginia
have not been conducted. See 0. Yucel, supra note 4, at 1-14. Authorities agree that water
must be impounded during the season of heavy flow for pipeline use during the dry season.
Id. See also Teknekron, Inc., Issues and Analysis: Proposed Virginia Coal Slurry Pipeline 10
(1982) (prepared for Virginia Railway Association); K. Drummond, supra note 3, at 2-5.
19. A riparian right is generally defined as a right which every person has to the benefit of
a natural water course passing through his land, for all useful purposes for which the water
may be used. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1192 (5th ed. 1979).
20. See infra text accompanying notes 126-141. See also T. BERGIN, ViRGINIA WATER LAW:
AN ECONOMIC APPRAsAL 106-140 (1975) (report to the State Water Control Board).
21. See infra text accompanying notes 142-152.
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but these rights are ill-defined.22 Moreover, judicial decisions in Virginia
indicate that impairment of riparian rights or groundwater rights by the
Commonwealth may require compensation.23 This latter section of the
note will also examine existing laws governing water allocation in Vir-
ginia, proposed changes in those laws, and the constitutional issue raised
by those suggestions.24
II. OvERvIEw OF EMINENT DOMAIN AND THE PUBLIC USE REQUIREMENT
A. Historical Background of Eminent Domain
Eminent domain is the power of a sovereign to take private property
for public use without the owner's consent upon payment of just compen-
sation.25 The implied corollary is that private property may not be taken
for private use, with or without compensation. Americans generally re-
gard eminent domain as a constitutional prerogative defined by the fifth
and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution.26 The
idea of eminent domain, however, emerged well before the Constitution
22. See infra text accompanying notes 153-170.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 184-218.
24. Issues raised by proposed interstate pipelines and environmental issues are beyond
the scope of this paper. For information on issues arising from an interstate pipeline, see
Colorado v. New Mexico, 103 S. Ct. 539 (1982) (holding that interstate disputes over surface
water allocation are settled according to the federal common law of equitable apportion-
ment); Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 102 S. Ct. 3456 (1982) (holding that statute
prohibiting the transfer of groundwater from one state to another violates the commerce
clause); H.R. 1010, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); S. 267, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); C.E.
Dinkins, Assistant Attorney General, Land and Natural Resources Division, U.S. Dept. of
Justice, Statements to the Subcomm. on Water Resources Division of Comm. on Environ-
ment and Public Works regarding Sporhase v. Nebraska (Sept. 15, 1982) (reprinted in CON-
GRESSiONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LmRARY OF CONGRESS, ARTICLE PACKET FOR USE IN COAL
SLURRY PIPELINES 9); Comment, State Restrictions, supra note 2. See also Abrams, In-
terbasin Transfers in a Riparian Jurisdiction, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 591, 608-23 (1983);
Comment, supra note 7.
For information on environmental issues, see Commonwealth ex rel. State Water Control
Bd. v. County Utils. Corp., 223 Va. 534, 290 S.E.2d 867 (1982); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-44.2
to 44.34:2 (Repl. Vol. 1982); Transportation Study, supra note 16, at 40-56; H. PEAvY & P.
JENNINGS, WATER POLLUTION POTENTIAL OF COAL SLURRY PIPELINES (1981) (reproduced by
National Technical Information Service, U.S. Dep't of Commerce); INDUSTRIAL ENVIRONMEN-
TAL RESEARCH LAB., U.S. ENvTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL AND POLLUTION As-
PECTS OF COAL SLURRY PIPELINES (March 1979) (excerpts reprinted in CONGRESSIONAL RE-
SEARCH SERVICE, LmRARY OF CONGRESS, ARTICLE PACKET FOR USE IN CoAL SLURRY PIPELINES
25); P. REED & G. WETSTONE, AIR AND WATER POLLUTION CONTROL LAW, 1982: A COMPRE-
HENSIVE EXAMINATION OF THE LAW PERTAINING TO THE CONTROL OF Am AND WATER POLLU-
TION wrrH EMPHASIS ON RECENT DEVELOFMENTS (1982).
25. 1 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.11 (3d rev. ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as
NICHOLS].
26. W. STOEnUCK, NONTRESPASSORY TAKINGS IN EMINENT DOMAIN 5 (1977). The fifth
amendment permits takings for public use; the fourteenth sets forth the parameters of due
process.
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was drafted. Commentators believe, in fact, that a form of eminent do-
main existed in the Roman Empire.27 The term itself originated with the
seventeenth century civil law writer, Hugo Grotius.2 s The writings of Gro-
tius and other Continental jurisprudents formed the theoretical frame-
work on which early American eminent domain doctrine was built.29 The
Continentalists contended that the power to expropriate private property
for public needs was vital to a government's existence, but they also sug-
gested that compensation be paid for property taken.30
American jurists were influenced as well by English practices surround-
ing the taking of private property, although it has been suggested that a
finding of "close continuity" between American and English law in this
instance is inappropriate."1 The term "eminent domain" is not used in
England, but the concept may be traced to the powers held by the
monarchs, known as prerogatives.32 These powers could be executed by
the crown without consent of Parliament and generally without payment
of compensation to the property owner. English monarchs could not use
their prerogatives to take estates in land, with or without compensation,
since that power belonged to Parliament alone.33
As the American colonies were settled, the power of eminent domain
was used to expropriate private land for roads, bridges, and mill dams.
The mill dam acts authorized an owner of land situated on a stream to
erect and operate a mill even though his neighbor's land would be flooded
by the process. 4 Mill dam acts generally applied only to grist mills, which
were considered a public benefit that contributed to the country's pros-
perity although they were operated for a profit by private individuals.3 5
The use of eminent domain for mill dams established a precedent which
would be used repeatedly as the new country expanded. Railroads were
the primary beneficiaries of eminent domain grants, and telephone and
power lines followed in their tracks.36
27. Id. at 4.
28. H. GROTIus, DE JuRe BELLI Ac PAcds 807 (F. Kelsey, trans. 1925), cited in W.
STOEBUCK, supra note 26, at 4.
29. W. STOEBUCK, supra note 26, at 12. See, e.g., Gardner v. Trustees of Village of New-
burg, 2 Johns. 162 (N.Y. 1816) (downstream riparian owner awarded compensation for water
taken by village waterworks project).
30. W. STOEBUCK, supra note 26, at 13.
31. Meidinger, The "Public Uses" of Eminent Domain: History and Policy, 11 ENVTL. L.
1, 9 (1980).
32. W. STOEBUCK, supra note 26, at 7.
33. Id. at 8.
34. See Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 9, 18-19 (1884) for a compilation of mill
dam acts. Virginia's act dates from 1667 and is apparently the earliest in the United States.
1 NIPHOLS, supra note 25, at § 1.22(8).
35. See, e.g., Crenshaw v. Slate River Co., 27 Va. (6 Rand.) 245, 263 (1828).
36. Meidinger, supra note 31, at 27. Use of eminent domain by railroads was upheld in
every jurisdiction in which it was challenged. See 2A NICHOLS, supra note 25, at § 7.521 for
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B. Defining "Public Use"
The emphasis placed on public use within the concept of eminent do-
main is an American adaptation.3 7 The term "public use" was found in
the Virginia and Pennsylvania constitutions of 1776,38 and similar lan-
guage appears in most state constitutions. 9 These provisions do not, how-
ever, clearly define the term. As the taking of private property for private
use is not expressly prohibited, states have developed two interpretations
of the public use requirement.
The narrow view defines public use as "actual use or right to use by the
public,"' 0 while the broad view holds that public use means "advantage or
benefit to the public."' 1 Under the broad view, a taking for an ostensibly
private use is permitted if that use accrues benefit to the public. For ex-
ample, electric power companies are given eminent domain powers be-
cause the public uses the product even though the public does not use or
have access to the plant itself. "Private purposes may be served inciden-
tally, but this does not destroy the public character of the
corporation ... "
When the public use requirement was first applied to turnpikes, canals,
and railroads, either definitional standard could be met. 3 However, the
difficulty in defining the appropriate standard became more apparent in
the mid-1800's as privately held corporations were granted eminent do-
main powers to condemn land for logging and mining enterprises. Al-
though the private benefit to the company appeared to overshadow the
anticipated use by the public, the takings were generally upheld by state
courts which liberally construed the public use requirement, predicating
their findings on the nature of the state's resources and industry."
case citations.
37. The term "public use" apparently originated with the Continental civil law commen-
tators. W. STOEBUCK, supra note 26, at 14. The requirement is not imposed in England.
Meidinger, supra note 31, at 12.
38. Meidinger, supra note 31, at 16. The constitutional language of 1776 has been incor-
porated into the present Virginia Constitution at art. I, § 6, which reads in part- " [A]I men
... cannot be... deprived of, or damaged in, their property for public uses, without their
own consent, or that of their representatives duly elected ......
39. W. STOEBUCK, supra note 26, at 5. Every state constitution except North Carolina's
contains language regarding the taking of private property. Id. Even though North Carolina
lacks a constitutional clause concerning the taking of private property, state courts have
recognized and liberally applied those principles. See Gray v. City of High Point, 203 N.C.
756, 166 S.E. 911 (1932); Hines v. City of Rocky Mount, 162 N.C. 409, 78 S.E. 510 (1913).
40. Berger, The Public Use Requirement in Eminent Domain, 57 Op. L. REv. 203, 205
(1978).
41. Id. See also Comment, Eminent Domain: Private Corporations and the Public Use
Limitation, 11 U. BALT. L. REv. 310, 312-13 (1982).
42. Light v. City of Danville, 168 Va. 181, 205, 190 S.E. 276, 285 (1937).
43. Meidinger, supra note 31, at 32.
44. Id. at 29. See, e.g., Great Falls Mfg. Co. v. Fernald, 47 N.H. 444 (1867) (appropriating
1983]
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Prior to an 1875 United States Supreme Court decision declaring that
the federal government could exercise eminent domain powers in its own
name,45 eminent domain proceedings were largely a matter of state law.46
Since the federal courts borrowed from state case law to shape their own
eminent domain doctrine, the broader view of public use was generally
adopted. 47 In addition, in reviewing state court decisions, the Supreme
Court has shown great deference to state findings of public use'8 but has
avoided setting forth a universal test.49 Most commentators, however, be-
lieve the Court has rejected the narrow interpretation." In a 1916 case
involving condemnation by an Alabama power company, Justice Holmes
stated: "The inadequacy of use by the general public as a universal test is
established." 5' 1
"Public use" resists precise definition because it "expand[s] when nec-
essary to encompass changing public needs. .... ,,52 It may appear that
almost any taking can be construed to meet the public use requirement,
as the amorphous nature of the doctrine requires a certain flexibility in
application."
C. "Public Use" in Virginia
Since colonial days, Virginia has recognized taking for public use as an
element of eminent domain.54 The authority to determine what consti-
the state's plentiful water power to encourage manufacturing held to be a public benefit);
Dayton Gold & Silver Mining Co. v. Seawell, 11 Nev. 394 (1876) (taking land for mining
found to be in the public benefit). But see, e.g., Ryerson v. Brown, 35 Mich. 333 (1877)
(condemnation not allowed for flour mill); Salt Co. v. Brown, 7 W. Va. 191 (1874) (proposed
taking of right of way by mining company held not for public use).
45. Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 374 (1875) (land taken for post office site).
46. Id. at 373.
47. Meidinger, supra note 31, at 30.
48. Id. at 30-31. The Supreme Court apparently has invalidated a state exercise of emi-
nent domain only once. See Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403 (1896) (holding
that where the state had ordered the railroad to allow a grain elevator on its property, such
a taking was invalid, since the elevator was not seen as benefitting the public).
49. Meidinger, supra note 31, at 30.
50. Id. at 34-35. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
51. Mount Vernon-Woodberry Cotton Duck Co. v. Alabama Interstate Power Co., 240
U.S. 30, 32 (1916).
52. Roe v. Kervick, 42 N.J. 191, 207, 199 A.2d 834, 842 (1964), quoted in City of Oakland
v. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d 60, 73, 646 P.2d 835, 842, 183 Cal. Rptr. 673, 680 (1982). See
also Texas Pipe Line Co. v. Snelbaker, 30 N.J. Super. 171, -, 103 A.2d 634, 638 (1954)
(quoting Scudder v. Trenton Delaware Falls Co., 1 N.J. Eq. 694 (1832)) ("The varying con-
dition of society is constantly presenting new objects of public importance and utility, and
what shall be considered a public use or benefit, may depend somewhat on the situation and
wants of the community for the time being.").
53. Meidinger, supra note 31, at 42.
54. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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tutes public use is vested in the General Assembly, 55 which may exercise
that power directly or through subordinate agencies.5" However, the legis-
lature cannot designate a private use public merely by declaring it so,
57
and the grantee does not become a public service corporation simply by
accepting a grant of eminent domain powers.5 The legislature determines
the expediency, necessity, and propriety of resorting to the exercise of
eminent domain,59 but the character of the use remains subject to judicial
review.60 The courts, however, will defer to legislative discretion unless
the use is clearly not a public one.61
Both the Virginia Code and the case law define public use. The statu-
tory definition declares that "[t]he term 'public uses'. . . embrace[s] all
uses which are necessary for public purposes.' 6 2 The case law character-
izes public use as that which is "meant for the use of many or where the
public is interested."63 A sampling of eminent domain cases indicates that
Virginia courts have established the following criteria to assist in applying
these definitions:
1. The use must be fixed and definite;
2. The use must remain independent of the condemner's will and be
guarded by the state;
3. The use must be necessary to the public's well being;
4. The necessity for the taking must be obvious."
A taking which fails to meet these tests is not one for public use. If the
public use requirement is not met, eminent domain powers may not be
exercised.
55. VA. CONST. art. I, § 11.
56. Jeter v. Vinton-Roanoke Water Co., 114 Va. 769, 776-77, 76 S.E. 921, 925 (1913).
57. See, e.g., Boyd v. C.C. Ritter Lumber Co., 119 Va. 348, 357, 89 S.E. 273, 276 (1916)
(construing Brown v. Gerald, 100 Me. 351, 61 A. 785 (1905)).
58. Boyd v. C.C. Ritter Lumber Co., 119 Va. at 366, 89 S.E. at 278 (construing Norfolk
County Water Co. v. Wood, 116 Va. 142, 81 S.E. 19 (1914)).
59. Ruddock v. City of Richmond, 165 Va. 552, 562, 178 S.E. 44, 48 (1935), aff'd, 183 S.E.
513, cert. denied, 298 U.S. 674 (1936). See Miller v. Town of Pulaski, 109 Va. 137, 143, 63
S.E. 880, 883 (1909) (citing LEwis, EMINENT DoMAIN § 238 (2d ed. 1900)).
60. Light v. City of Danville, 168 Va. 181, 208, 190 S.E. 276, 287 (1937). But see Plecker v.
Rhodes, 71 Va. (30 Gratt.) 795 (1878).
61. Jeter v. Vinton-Roanoke Water Co., 114 Va. 769, 777, 76 S.E. 921, 925 (1913) (quoting
T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 660-61 (6th ed. 1890)).
62. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-276 (Repl. Vol. 1981).
63. Jeter, 114 Va. at 778, 76 S.E. at 925 (citing Seely v. Sebastian, 4 Or. 27 (1870)).
64. See, e.g., Peck Iron & Metal Co. v. Colonial Pipeline Co., 206 Va. 711, 146 S.E.2d 169,
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 823 (1966); Light v. City of Danville, 168 Va. 181, 190 S.E. 276 (1937);
Boyd v. C.C. Ritter Lumber Co., 119 Va. 348, 89 S.E. 273 (1916); Fallsburg & Co. v. Alexan-
der, 101 Va. 98, 43 S.E. 194 (1903).
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III. APPLYING THE PUBLIC USE REQUIREMENT To COAL SLURRY
PIPELINES
Proponents contend coal slurry pipelines meet the public use require-
ment; opponents claim they do pot. Since it would appear both sides may
be influenced by extra-altruistic considerations, 5 an objective analysis of
the coal slurry pipeline - public use issue may be helpful to fully assess
whether the slurry companies should be entitled to exercise eminent do-
main powers. As observed in the preceding section, Virginia case law has
set forth guidelines for determining the public use requirement." Apply-
ing these criteria to a coal slurry pipeline is one approach to measuring its
public use quotient. A similar approach was used by the Virginia Su-
preme Court in Peck Iron & Metal Co. v. Colonial Pipeline Co. 67 In that
case, Peck questioned Colonial's right of eminent domain to take an ease-
ment across Peck's land for a pipeline to transport petroleum products.
The court recognized petroleum products as an essential public need and
held the taking was for a public use because the applicable requirements
had been met."
A. Use Must Be Fixed and Definite
Statutes conferring eminent domain powers are strictly construed. 9
Courts measure carefully the words used by legislators, adding nothing by
implication,70 and construing any ambiguity in the grant against the con-
demner and in favor of the public.1 A grant of eminent domain to a pri-
vate corporation must explicitly state the corporate purpose for which the
grant is made. A company's status as a public service corporation with
eminent domain powers is not determined by what it actually does or
intends to do, but by what its charter prescribes it must do as a public
duty.7 2 "Mere recognition of the corporation in its charter as an 'Internal
65. See, e.g., Dismal Swamp Ry. Co. v. John L. Roper Lumber Co., 114 Va. 537, 553-54,
77 S.E. 598, 604 (1913) (quoting Wellsburg & S.L.R. Co. v. Panhandle Traction Co., 56 W.
Va. 26, 48 S.E. 746, 750 (1904)) ("Other motives than the mere operation of a common
carrier and other works of internal improvement always move the people who build them,
else none would ever be constructed. They constitute fields of profitable investment . .
66. See supra text accompanying note 64.
67. 206 Va. 711, 146 S.E.2d 169, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 823 (1966).
68. Id. at 715-16, 146 S.E.2d at 172.
69. Light v. City of Danville, 168 Va. 181, 196, 190 S.E. 276, 281 (1937). See also Ohio
Power Co. v. Deist, 154 Ohio St. 473, 96 N.E.2d 771, 773 (1951).
70. See, e.g., Botts v. Southwest Pipe-Line Co., 190 Ga. 689, -, 10 S.E.2d 375, 384
(1940).
71. Rice v. Railroad Co., 66 U.S. (1 Black) 358 (1861) (quoted in Jeter v. Vinton-Roanoke
Water Co., 114 Va. 769, 786-87, 76 S.E. 921, 928 (1913) (Buchanan & Whittle, JJ.,
dissenting)).
72. Boyd v. C.C. Ritter Lumber Co., 119 Va. 348, 365, 89 S.E. 273, 278 (1916) (construing
Norfolk County Water Co. v. Wood, 116 Va. 142, 81 S.E. 19 (1914)).
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Improvement Company' does not make it so .... ,73 In Fallsburg & Com-
pany v. Alexander,7 for example, the General Assembly had authorized a
private company to condemn private property "[tjo erect, maintain and
operate its plant ... for its own use or the use of other individuals or
corporations. ... 75 Although public benefit was implicitly stated, the
court found the public benefit attributed to the plant by the company's
charter to be "vague, indefinite and uncertain...., 7  The proposed tak-
ing thus was held invalid.
7 7
On the other hand, cases involving condemnations by municipal power
and water companies generally have been upheld by the court because the
nature, character and extent of public use overrides an incidental private
benefit.78 The primary purpose of the use determines its nature.7 9 The
private benefit may be served incidentally as long as the public benefit
predominates.8 0 Observing the line of demarcation between private bene-
fit and public use, however, can be difficult.8 1 In Phillips v. Foster,8 2 the
Virginia Supreme Court found a condemnation proceeding to acquire an
easement for a drainage ditch invalid because the public use was not pre-
dominant. The taking was characterized as an attempt by a private indi-
vidual to develop his property for his own purposes. The court found his
contention that the ditch ultimately would benefit the public to be mis-
placed. 3 The common interest necessary for public use was not clearly
delineated and the proceeding did not pass judicial muster."
Public use is not measured by the number of people served. "The pub-
lic use required need not be the use or benefit of the whole public or
state, or any large portion of it."85 Service to one customer has been
73. Fallsburg & Co. v. Alexander, 101 Va. 98, 109, 43 S.E. 194, 198 (1903).
74. 101 Va. 98, 43 S.E. 194 (1903).
75. Id. at 99, 43 S.E. at 195.
76. Id. at 109, 43 S.E. at 198.
77. Id. at 110, 43 S.E. at 199.
78. See, e.g., Light, 168 Va. 181, 190 S.E. 276 (1937).
79. Id. at 211, 190 S.E. at 288.
80. In some instances, the profit inuring to the private corporation conducting the enter-
prise is regarded as compensation for the benefit conferred. See, e.g., Jeter, 114 Va. at 784,
76 S.E. at 927 (construing Beekman v. Saratoga & S.R.R., 3 Paige Ch. 45 (N.Y. Ch. 1831),
reprinted in 22 Am. Dec. 679 (1881)).
81. Light, 168 Va. at 206, 190 S.E. at 276 (construing Nichols v. Central Va. Power Co.,
143 Va. 405, 130 S.E. 764 (1925)).
82. 215 Va. 543, 211 S.E.2d 93 (1975).
83. Id. at 546-47, 211 S.E.2d at 96. ("The salient consideration is not whether public ben-
efit results, but whether a public use is predominant").
84. Id. But cf. Rudder v. Wise County Redev. & Hous. Auth., 219 Va. 592, 249 S.E.2d 177
(1978), appeal dismissed, 441 U.S. 939 (1979).
85. Miller v. Town of Pulaski, 109 Va. 137, 143, 63 S.E. 880, 883 (1909) (quoting LEwis,
EMiNENT DOMN § 161 (2d ed. 1900)); accord Phillips Pipe Line Co. v. Brandstetter, 241
Mo. App. 1138, -, 263 S.W.2d 880, 886 (1954) (construing Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles
County, 262 U.S. 700 (1923)).
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found to serve a public need. In Handley v. Cook, 6 the West Virginia
Supreme Court affirmed the right of a power company to condemn land
for construction of a high voltage power line to serve a single coal mining
operation. The court reasoned that supplying electricity was a public
use.
8 7
In Virginia, utility companies, as well as gas and oil pipeline companies,
are designated by statute as public service corporations empowered to ex-
ercise eminent domain for their enterprises.8 Coal slurry pipelines are
designed to transport coal. Coal is used by power companies to generate
electricity. Electricity benefits the public. By analogy, it would seem that
a coal pipeline company could be organized for a purpose which would be
sufficiently fixed and definite to constitute public use.89
B. Use Must Be Protected
A use is protected if the public's legal right to it cannot be denied or
withdrawn at will by the condemner once he acquires the property. 0 A
protected use remains a public use because the public continues to pos-
sess the right to receive and enjoy the benefit of the use.91 The state, as
sovereign, guards the public use by supervising and regulating the indus-
try involv'ed . 2 Mill dam acts were found to be constitutional uses of emi-
nent domain because the grist mills they authorized were considered pub-
lic utilities subject to state control.83 However, mills which were viewed
solely as private enterprises were not accorded eminent domain status
since the mill owner could at any time devote his property to a different
use or dispose of it entirely.9 4 If the use by the public is permissive and
86. 252 S.E.2d 147 (W. Va. 1979).
87. Id. at 147.
88. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-260 (Repl. Vol. 1981).
89. See, e.g., Light, 168 Va. at 205, 190 S.E. at 285. Whether a pipeline is to be laid to
transport petroleum or coal, the requisite easement would be the same. A court could
reasonably find that a grant of eminent domain to pipeline companies to transport petro-
leum products necessarily implies a similar grant for the purpose of transporting coal. Note,
"Public Use" as a Limitation on the Exercise of the Eminent Domain Power by Private
Entities, 50 IowA L. REv. 799, 803 (1965).
90. See, e.g., Fallsburg & Co. v. Alexander, 101 Va. 98, 107, 43 S.E. 194, 198 (1903) (citing
LEwis, EmiNENT DOMAIN § 165 (2d ed. 1900)).
91. Peck Iron & Metal Co. v. Colonial Pipeline Co., 206 Va. 711, 715, 146 S.E.2d 169, 172
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 823 (1966).
92. Peck Iron & Metal Co., 206 Va. at 716, 146 S.E.2d at 172.
93. Boyd v. C.C. Ritter Lumber Co., 119 Va. 348, 362, 89 S.E. 273, 277 (1916) (referring to
Varner v. Martin, 21 W. Va. 534 (1883)). Grain was ground for a toll fixed by law and was to
be ground in the order presented; if a mill was destroyed, the owner was required to rebuild
it within a specified period. 119 Va. at 362, 89 S.E. at 277.
94. Bailey v. Anderson, 182 Va. 70, 74, 27 S.E.2d 914, 915-16 (1943) cert. denied 321 U.S.
799 (1944) ("[T]he test of whether or not property has been devoted to public use is what
the owner must do, not what he may choose to do.").
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may be abandoned at any time, the use is not independent of the owner's
will" and therefore is private.
Railroads allege that coal slurry pipelines are a private use. The rail-
road industry's position is that coal pipelines will not be common carriers
and the public's right to use the pipelines will not be independent of the
slurry companies. 8 The holding in Boyd v. C.C. Ritter Lumber Co.9 of-
fers some support for the railroad's view. In that case, a lumber company
sought to condemn land to build a tramroad to haul logs. The act delegat-
ing eminent domain authority to the company provided:
[N]othing in this act shall operate to give any person, firm or corporation, a
right to the exclusive use of such [road] ... ; and the public shall have the
right to use the said land for travel as other public roads are used, and any
other person, firm or corporation shall have an equal right to use the said
[road] . . . upon paying proper compensation therefore. 8
The court refuted the lumber company's contention that the proposed
tramroad would benefit the general public.99 Since the company was not a
common carrier, it was not compelled to carry public goods over its tram-
road, and the public's right to use the road was dependent on supplying
its own mode of transportation."°°
Some smaller coal producers also fear that access to the slurry pipeline
will be limited.101 Slurry supporters, however, maintain the pipeline will
be available to all shippers.102 As a public service corporation, a coal pipe-
line in Virginia would be subject to many of the same limitations as gas
and oil pipelines, other public utility companies, and railroads.10 3 It would
appear likely, therefore, that the public use could be adequately
protected.
C. Use Must Be Necessary To Public Well Being
A use is considered necessary if denying the use would cause great
hardship and inconvenience to the public.10' Since an economical, effi-
95. Id.
96. Comment, supra note 5, at 465.
97. 119 Va. 348, 89 S.E. 273 (1916).
98. Id. at 351, 89 S.E. at 274.
99. Id. at 356, 89 S.E. at 275.
100. Id.
101. Coal Slurry Bill Approved by Senate Panel, 41 CONG. Q. WxLy. REP. 751 (1983).
102. Comment, supra note 5, at 465. H.B. 262, 1983 Va. Gen. Assem., specifically required
that coal pipeline carriers reasonably accomodate small coal operators.
103. For example, H.B. 262, 1983 Va. Gen. Assem., provided that coal pipelines would be
taxed in the same manner as railway companies.
104. See, e.g., Fallsburg Power & Mfg. Co. v. Alexander, 101 Va. 98, 104, 43 S.E. 194, 196
(1903).
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cient coal transportation system is essential to meet energy needs, an ef-
fective way to assess the necessity of the coal slurry pipeline to the public
well being is to compare it to the railroad.
Coal slurry pipelines are believed to have less adverse environmental
impact than trains. They do not cause noise or air pollution. 05 They are
located underground, eliminating traffic hazards generally associated with
railway crossings. 0 6 However, coal pipelines are criticized by environmen-
tal and agricultural groups because they use an excessive amount of
water.'0 7 One ton of water is required to ship one ton of coal.'08 In addi-
tion, there is a problem with disposal of the water extracted from the coal
after its removal from the pipeline. 0 9
Coal slurry pipelines are considered more economical to operate than
trains. The effect of inflation on pipelines is minimal since large capital
outlays occur only at the time of construction." 0 Operating costs are re-
duced because less labor is required; a coal pipeline requires one-seventh
the manpower of rail shipment to move an equivalent amount of coal."'
However, railroads contend that since they employ more workers, they
create a greater public benefit. 2 Slurry opponents fear that the loss of
revenue to the railroads from decreased coal business would result in
massive lay-offs of railway workers." 3
Various studies comparing the energy efficiency of trains to pipelines
have been conducted by railroad, coal and utility interests. While it ap-
pears pipelines work at their maximum efficiency when carrying large
volumes of coal long distances,' 4 the two systems are comparable in en-
ergy use for similar distances, terrain and capacity.1 5 According to sup-
105. Comment, State Restrictions, supra note 2, at 665.
106. Id.
107. Id., at 666-67; Johnson & Schneider, supra note 2, at 32-33. One suggested solution
has been to recycle the water. This, however, would increase construction and operation
costs. Comment, State Restrictions, supra note 2, at 673. A second proposed solution would
be to use water unsuited for other purposes, but this would exacerbate disposal problems.
The issues of water usage and water rights are as important to the coal pipeline controversy
as the eminent domain issue. See infra notes 126-218 and accompanying text.
108. Comment, State Restrictions, supra note 2, at 666.
109. Id. at 675.
110. Johnson & Schneider, supra note 2, at 27-28.
111. Comment,'State Restrictions, supra note 2, at 665.
112. Comment, supra note 5, at 454.
113. Id. at 459; Comment, State Restrictions, supra note 2, at 669-70.
114. Comment, supra note 5, at 455.
115. Coal Distribution and Utilization Act of 1982: Hearings on S.B. 1844 Before the
Subcomm. on Surface Transp. of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science & Transp., 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. 77 (1982) (statement of Ross Workman, Chairman, Slurry Transp. Ass'n and
Senior Vice-president, Continental Resources Co.). In his remarks to the subcommitte,
Workman referred to a study prepared in 1982 by the Virginia Center for Coal & Energy
Research at the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, which analyzed eight
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porters, though, the most significant advantage of coal pipelines is that
they will offer competition to railroads which may reduce freight rates.2
1 6
Whether or not coal slurry pipelines meet the "necessary" test depends
upon a balancing of diverse factors. A site-specific analysis would be nec-
essary to properly determine the pipeline's advantages and
disadvantages."
D. Necessity for Taking Must Be Obvious
The element of necessity requires a need for the proposed service which
can only be met by taking particular property.11 8 The location of the
property or the character of the use must preclude the public from ob-
taining other equally suitable property.1 9 Coal shippers have identified a
need for pipeline transportation which can only be met by crossing rail-
road rights of way. Alternate routes which would avoid crossing tracks
and easements are apparently not feasible since railroads have extensive
land holdings.1 20 Moreover, in Virginia, as in most eastern states, rail-
roads acquired their land in fee simple.121 They may use their property as
absolutely and unrestrictedly as an individual fee owner.122 Thus, without
railroad cooperation, laying a coal pipeline appears impossible unless coal
different possible pipeline routes running across Virginia and concluded that energy effi-
ciency was not a dispositive factor in choosing between trains and pipelines. See also VA. S.
Doc. No. 13, Reg. Sess. 4 (1983).
116. Interview with L. Blaine Carter, President of the Virginia Coal Association, Rich-
mond, Virginia (July 18, 1983). See also Johnson & Schneider, supra note 2, at 30.
117. One authority advocates use of a site-dependency test to establish public use. As
applied, his approach balances the interests of all parties involved so that the taking results
in minimizing private injury while maximizing public good. Meidinger, supra note 31, at 45-
49.
118. In Virginia the element of necessity is also applied on a different level in situations
involving two corporations with eminent domain powers. One such corporation shall not
take the other's property by condemnation if the property is essential to the other corpora-
tion's purpose. VA. CODE ANN. § 25-233 (Repl. Vol. 1980). Virginia case law has generally
protected railroads from takings by other entities on the theory that curtailing railroad op-
erations is not in the public interest. See, e.g., City of Bristol v. Virginia & S.W. Ry. Co., 200
Va. 617, 625, 107 S.E.2d 473, 478 (1959). However, the Virginia House Bill drafted in 1983
expressly provided that Virginia Code § 25-233 would not be applicable to eminent domain
proceedings involving coal pipelines. H.B. 262, 1983 Va. Gen. Assem. § 56-537.
119. See, e.g., Fallsburg & Co. v. Alexander, 101 Va. 98, 104, 43 S.E. 194, 196 (1903).
120. Interview, supra note 116 ("You can't go 25 miles in any direction in Southwest
Virginia without crossing railroad tracks.").
121. See Blondell v. Guntner, 118 Va. 11, 12, 86 S.E. 897, 897 (1915); see also Norfolk &
W. Ry. v. Bremco Mills, 288 N.E.2d 868, 871-72 (Ohio 1971) (holding that in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, courts will presume that the railroad acquired a fee simple abso-
lute estate).
In contrast, railroads in the western states acquired their rights of way through federal
and state land grants such as the Union Pacific Act of 1862. Comment, Coal Slurry and
Railroad Crossings, supra note 2, at 1081 n.57.
122. 65 AM. JuR. 2D Railroads § 102 (1972).
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slurry companies are granted eminent domain powers.
Railroads refute these contentions by noting that rights of way for the
proposed Wyoming to Arkansas slurry were obtained by Energy Trans-
portation Systems, Inc., without using eminent domain.123 However, the
numerous court cases filed by Energy Transportation Systems to secure
easements12 ' added considerable delay and expense to the project. More-
over, since other groups of landowners are also opposed to slurries, use of
eminent domain would provide an expedient and uniform resolution to
pipeline acquisition problems.1 25
IV. SURFACE WATER ALLOCATION
A. The Riparian Doctrine
In Virginia, surface water allocation is largely a matter of riparian
rights. The riparian landowner does not own the water but has the usu-
fructuary right 2 ' to extract and use the water flowing through and by his
land. 127
The well settled general rule on this point is that each proprietor has ex
jure naturae an equal right to the reasonable use of the water running in a
natural course through or by his land for every useful purpose to which it
can be applied, whether domestic, agricultural or manufacturing, providing
it continues to run, after such use, as it is wont to do, without material
diminution or alteration and without pollution; but he cannot diminish its
quantity materially or exhaust it (except perhaps for domestic purposes and
in the watering of cattle) to the prejudice of the lower proprietors, unless he
has acquired a right to do so by grant, prescription or license. 28
As can be seen, a withdrawal which "materially diminishes" the flow
available for lower riparian uses probably would be deemed unreasonable.
The proposed coal slurry pipeline will demand approximately two million
gallons of water each day 2 9 from water sources in southwest Virginia.
123. Coal Slurry Eminent Domain Approved by Interior Panel, 41 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP.
705, 706 (1983).
124. See, e.g., Energy Transp. Sys. v. Union Pac. R.R., 619 F.2d 696 (8th Cir. 1980); En-
ergy Transp. Sys. v. Union Pac. R.R., 606 F.2d 934 (10th Cir. 1979).
125. Johnson & Schneider, supra note 2, at 36.
126. A usufruct is "the right of enjoying a thing, the property of which is vested in an-
other, and to draw from the same all profit, utility, and advantage which it may produce,
providing it be without altering the subtance of the thing." A usufructuary right is the right
to enjoy anything in which one has no property interest. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1384 (5th
ed. 1979).
127. See, e.g., Taylor v. Commonwealth, 102 Va. 759, 773, 47 S.E. 875, 880-81 (1904). See
generally Ausness, Water Rights Legislation in the East: A Program for Reform, 24 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 547, 548-50 (1983).
128. Hite v. Town of Luray, 175 Va. 218, 225, 8 S.E.2d 369, 372 (1940).
129. 0. Yucel, supra note 4, at 1-11.
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Should the proposed withdrawals of water interfere with other reasonable
uses, pipeline owners might be enjoined from further use"' or held liable
for damages. 131 Admittedly the riparian doctrine has not been the source
of prolific litigation, as water resources in Virginia are plentiful. However,
with increasing water demands, this situation could change, and pipeline
operators should be aware of the potential for private litigation.
Pipeline owners should also be aware that the riparian doctrine does
not ensure continuous, fixed rights to water supplies.1 32 Prior use does not
insulate a riparian owner from liability.133 Riparian rights are appurte-
nant to the land and every riparian owner has an equal right to the use of
the water regardless of when he initiates his use. Therefore, a use which is
reasonable today may become unreasonable tomorrow. If a lower riparian
owner alters his water use, or if a newcomer introduces a use, the upper
riparian owner's extraction may become unreasonable in reference to the
altered needs of his neighbors.1 3 4
Furthermore, highly profitable or beneficial community uses are not
considered more reasonable than ordinary uses. In fact, an upper riparian
owner may materially diminish or exhaust the water supply as long as his
use is reasonable for ordinary domestic and agricultural purposes. 3 5 In
disputes over riparian rights, the courts have refused to "'chisel away'
vested rights of property of private individuals, however humble and ob-
scure the owner, for the benefit of the public or the great corporations."'' 3
Critics of the common law claim that the uncertainty of water rights is
the greatest drawback to the application of the riparian doctrine.1 37 The
130. See, e.g., Town of Purcellville v. Potts, 179 Va. 514, 522, 19 S.E.2d 700, 703 (1942).
131. See, e.g., Norfolk & W. Ry. v. A.C. Allen & Sons, 122 Va. 603, 613, 95 S.E. 406, 408
(1918).
132. "[T]he right of no one is absolute, but is qualified by the rights of others to have the
stream substantially preserved in its natural size, flow and purity ... ." Arminius Chem.
Co. v. Landrum, 113 Va. 7, 16, 73 S.E. 459, 464 (1912) (quoting Strobel v. Kerr Salt Co., 164
N.Y. 303, -, 58 N.E. 142, 147 (1900)). "The reasonableness of the use depends upon the
nature and size of the stream, the business or purposes to which it is made subservient, and
on the ever-varying circumstances of each use." Davis v. Town of Harrisonburg, 116 Va. 864,
869, 83 S.E. 401, 403 (1914).
133. See, e.g., Norfolk & W. Ry. v. A.C. Allen & Sons, 122 Va. 603, 95 S.E. 406 (1918).
But see Mumpower v. City of Bristol, 90 Va. 151, 153, 17 S.E. 853, 854 (1893) (suggesting
that a proprietor who first erects a dam for a useful purpose has a right to maintain it, as
against lower proprietors).
134. See Walker & Cox, Virginia Water Policy: The Imprecise Mandate, 14 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 312, 324 (1972). For a general discussion of the uncertainty of "reasonable
use," see T. BERGIN, supra note 20, at 110.
135. See, e.g., Hite v. Town of Luray, 175 Va. at 225, 8 S.E.2d at 372.
136. Arminius Chem. Co. v. Landrum, 113 Va. at 18, 73 S.E. at 464. (citing Drake v. Lady
Essley Coal, Iron & Ry., 102 Ala. 501, _, 14 So. 749, 751 (1894)). See also Town of
Purcellville v. Potts, 179 Va. at 522-23, 19 S.E.2d at 703 (stating that the fact that the
defendant is a municipality does not relieve it from the application of riparian doctrine).
137. See supra text accompanying notes 132-34.
1983] 805
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
reasonableness of an anticipated use is difficult to predict. It can only be
determined by the courts. In fact, a complainant may be compelled to
wait until a facility is built and operating before damages can be ascer-
tained or an injunction can be granted."3 8
Riparian rights are alienable and severable, 139 thus, an anxious pipeline
owner could purchase the riparian rights of lower proprietors. However,
such a purchase could involve costly and lengthy title searches. Moreover,
a non-cooperating riparian owner might still complain that the combined
use of these newly-acquired riparian rights is more unreasonable than
previous uses. Detractors of the riparian doctrine contend that it discour-
ages the development of profitable enterprises which depend upon secure
supplies of water. 40 The General Assembly, however, has been reluctant
to tamper with existing riparian rights,141 and pipeline investors would be
wise to consider the common law obstacles to a continuous and adequate
water supply.
B. The Prohibition Against Interbasin Transfers of Water
The Supreme Court of Virginia has held that a diversion of water for
use beyond riparian land deprives lower proprietors of the natural flow
and is therefore an extraordinary and unreasonable use.142 Such a diver-
sion is a nuisance requiring injunctive relief. 43 Riparian land is land
within the natural watershed of the stream and which is adjacent to the
stream. Riparian rights are confined to the watershed so that the water,
after its use, will drain back into the stream. The lower riparian land of
the stream "is entitled . . . to the use of the waters.' 44
This rule has been interpreted as barring the interbasin transfer of
water. 45 Current pipeline proposals depend upon the transfer of water
from streams in southwest Virginia to waterbasins within the Tidewater
138. See, e.g., Town of Purceilville v. Potts, 179 Va. at 523, 19 S.E.2d at 704.
139. See Marine Resources Comm'n v. Forbes, 214 Va. 109, 112, 197 S.E.2d 195, 198
(1973); Thurston v. City of Portsmouth, 205 Va. 909, 912, 140 S.E.2d 678, 680 (1965); Hite v.
Town of Luray, 175 Va. at 224, 8 S.E.2d at 371.
140. T. BERGIN, supra note 20, at 111.
141. See infra text accompanying notes 171-84.
142. See Town of Purceilville v. Potts, 179 Va. 514, 19 S.E.2d 700 (1942); Virginia Hot
Springs Co. v. Hoover, 143 Va. 460, 130 S.E. 408 (1925); Town of Gordonsville v. Zinn, 129
Va. 542, 106 S.E. 508 (1921). See also Cook v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 107 Va. 32, 57 S.E.
564 (1907).
143. Carpenter v. Gold, 88 Va. 551, 553, 14 S.E. 329, 329 (1892).
144. Town of Gordonsville v. Zinn, 129 Va. at 552, 106 S.E. at 511. (citing Anaheim Union
Water Co. v. Fuller, 150 Cal. 327, -, 88 P. 978, 980 (1907)).
145. See 1971-72 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 79; G. BALILES, DISSENT TO REPORT OF THE STATE
WATER STUDY COMMISSION TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF VIRGINIA OF
1981, at 13 (1981).
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area.146 Therefore, the common law prohibition against the diversion is a
direct threat to the successful implementation of the pipeline.
Although the diversion of water for use beyond riparian land is barred,
a complainant may have to show actual, substantial injury before relief
can be granted. "The diversion alone, without evidence of such damage,
does not warrant a recovery even of nominal damages."'' 47 However, on
more than one occasion, the Supreme Court of Virginia has held that a
complainant may prove injury by demonstrating a threat to a reasonable
future use. s 48 The Court also has indicated that a diversion for use be-
yond riparian land alone would sustain a cause of action: "[A] diversion
of a natural watercourse though without actual damage to a lower ripa-
rian owner, is an infringement of a legal right and imports damage, and
that infringement a court of equity will prevent.2149
Thus, it is unclear what degree of damage must be shown in order to
obtain relief against diversion. Conceivably, pipeline owners could divert
water without repercussions. The riparian doctrine defines private rights
and suit must be brought before a diversion is enjoined. If water re-
sources are so abundant that lower riparian owners remain uninjured, the
likelihood of litigation is small. This could be an expensive gamble for
pipeline investors.
Most cases involving interbasin transfers were decided around the turn
of the century. However, as recently as 1942, the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia championed the rights of a single riparian owner, holding the diver-
sion of water by a town for domestic use was prohibited.'50 The court
suspended injunction so that the town could acquire the plaintiff's rights
in a "lawful manner, that is, by condemnation proceedings."' 6'5 Had this
procedure not been followed, the court appeared willing to see the town's
water system dismantled - a system which was completed at a cost of
$87,000.15 The prohibition against interbasin transfers of water is the
single most significant obstacle posed by the common law to the success
of the pipeline.
146. See supra note 4.
147. Virginia Hot Springs v. Hoover, 143 Va. at 467, 130 S.E. at 410 (citing Stratton v.
Mount Herman Boys' School, 216 Mass. 83, 103 N.E. 87 (1913)).
148. See, e.g., Virginia Hot Springs v. Hoover, 143 Va. at 467, 130 S.E. at 410; Town of
Gordonsville v. Zinn, 129 Va. at 560, 106 S.E. at 514.
149. Town of Purcellville v. Potts, 179 Va. at 524, 19 S.E.2d at 704. See also Rankin v.
Town of Harrisonburg, 104 Va. 524, 528, 52 S.E. 555, 556 (1906) (indicating that a riparian
owner need not show injury to sustain a cause of action against one who impairs his rights).
150. Town of Purcellville v. Potts, 179 Va. 514, 19 S.E.2d 700 (1942).
151. Id. at 524, 19 S.E. at 704.
152. Id. at 520. 19 S.E. at 702.
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V. GROUNDWATER ALLOCATION
A. Common Law
Groundwater is also a potential source of water supply for the pipe-
line11 and its use has certain advantages over surface water supply. The
conformation of underground sources in southwest Virginia is such that a
withdrawal from one well generally will not interfere with the well of a
neighbor.'" Therefore, the potential for private litigation is reduced.
Although the availability of sufficient groundwater resources has not
been researched in detail, the limited resources in the area generally are
admitted.18 5 Therefore, surface water is a more likely source of supply for
the pipeline. Still, groundwater has not been ruled out as a potential
water source, and an examination of Virginia law governing its allocation
is useful.
Like surface water, groundwater is allocated among private proprietors
according to common law. If underground water flows in an identifiable
subterranean stream, it is governed by the same riparian rules that apply
to surface water.1 5 s Where, however, water does not appear to flow in a
well-defined channel, the water is presumed to be "the result of the ordi-
nary percolations of water in the soil.''1
The common law in Virginia governing percolating groundwater is un-
clear. Miller v. Black Rock Springs Improvement Co.,155 the single Vir-
ginia case dealing directly with groundwater allocation, suggests that Vir-
ginia follows the "English rule." 59 Under this rule, a landowner has the
right to extract and consume unlimited quantities of the water collected
beneath his land.16 0 A neighbor whose water supply is fed from the same
source cannot complain that his own water supply is damaged. 1" The ex-
tracting landowner's right is absolute. "Such underground waters are as
much the property of the owners of the land as the ores, rocks, etc. be-
153. See supra note 17.
154. T. BERGIN, supra note 20, at 200.
155. See K. Drummond, supra note 3, at 3; 0. Yucel, supra note 4, at 42.
156. Henderson v. Wade Sand & Gravel Co., 388 So. 2d 900, 901 (Ala. 1980). See Miller v.
Black Rock Springs Improvement Co., 99 Va. 747, 40 S.E. 27 (1901). For a general discus-
sion of common law rights in groundwater, see Ausness, supra note 127, at 550-52.
157. Couch v. Clinchfield Coal Corp., 148 Va. 455, 464, 139 S.E. 314, 316 (1927). See Hen-
derson, 388 So. 2d at 901. The burden of proving that subterranean water flows in a well-
defined stream is difficult. Proof must consist of observable facts on the surface. See, e.g.,
Miller, 99 Va. at 757, 40 S.E. at 30.
158. 99 Va. 747, 40 S.E. 27 (1901).
159. Id. at 754, 40 S.E. at 29. See Couch v. Clinchfield Coal Corp., 148 Va. 455, 139 S.E.
314 (1927); Henninger v. McGinnis, 131 Va. 70, 108 S.E. 671 (1921).
160. For a discussion of the English rule, see Hanks, The Law of Water in New Jersey, 22
RuTGERs L. REv. 621, 628-29 (1968).
161. See, e.g., Miller, 99 Va. at 759, 40 S.E. at 31.
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neath the soil.
1 6 2
Although detractors of the English rule complain that its application
discourages conservation, the rule has the advantage of certainty.163 If the
English rule is indeed the law in Virginia, pipeline operators may extract
all the available groundwater beneath their land without repercussions
from other landowners.
Despite the rule in Miller, dicta in several more recent cases imply that
Virginia has adopted the "American rule" of groundwater allocation.' 6'
This rule permits the landowner to extract and consume an unlimited
amount of water as long as the water is put to reasonable and beneficial
use.16 5 This appears to be only a slight variation of the English theme.
However, the variation could prove a critical impediment to the operation
of a pipeline. Many courts interpreting the American rule have held the
removal of water for use beyond the overlying land to be reasonable un-
less it injures a landowner sharing the same water source.'66 Therefore,
the application of the American rule in Virginia might prohibit the trans-
162. Id. at 760, 40 S.E. at 31.
163. T. BEROIN, supra note 20, at 210-11.
164. "Mining operations, being a reasonable use of land, do not, in general, make one
carrying on such operations liable because percolating waters are intercepted or drawn away
so as to destroy or injure springs or wells belonging to the owner of the surface or of adjoin-
ing lands." Oakwood Smokeless Coal Corp. v. Meadows, 184 Va. 168, 176, 34 S.E.2d 392, 396
(1945). See also Clinchfield Coal Corp. v. Compton, 148 Va. 437, 452, 139 S.E. 308, 313
(1927) (stating that the trend of modem opinion is in favor of the American "reasonable
use" rule).
165. Woodsum v. Township of Pemberton, 172 N.J. Super. 489, 412 A.2d 1064 (1980),
af'd, 177 N.J. Super. 639, 427 A.2d 615 (1981); Bayer v. Nello L. Teer Co., 256 N.C. 509, 124
S.E.2d 552 (1962); T. BERGIN, supra note 20, at 210.
Reasonable use is not defined in reference to the correlative rights of others. Woodsum,
172 N.J. Super at ., 412 A.2d at 1071. The Supreme Court of Virginia apparently has
rejected the correlative use rule. See, e.g., Miller, 99 Va. at 750, 40 S.E. at 28. For a general
definition and discussion of the correlative use rule, see Woodsum, 172 N.J. Super at _,
412 A.2d at 1071-72. "Reasonable use" is given a special and restricted meaning under the
American rules. Wasteful use of water is "unreasonable only if it cause[s] harm, and any
non-wasteful use of water that cause[s] harm [is] nontheless reasonable if it [is] made on or
in connection with the overlying land." Henderson v. Wade Sand & Gravel Co., 388 So. 2d
900, 902 (Ala. 1980) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SEcoN) OF TORTs § 857 (1979)).
166. For discussion of reasonable use under the American Rule, see Woodsum, 172 N.J.
Super. at -, 412 A.2d at 1076.
For uses held to be reasonable, see Finley v. Teeter Stone Co., 251 Md. 428, 248 A.2d 106
(1968) (holding that pumping of percolating waters incident to operation of a quarry is a
reasonable use); Bayer v. Nello L. Teer Co., 256 N.C. 509, 124 S.E.2d 552 (1962) (no liability
for operation of rock quarry, according to best practices of open pit mining, resulting in
damage to adjacent landowner's well). But see Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. Wilkes,
231 Ala. 511, 165 So. 764 (1936) (applying the "reasonable use" rule), overruled by Hender-
son v. Wade Sand & Gravel Co., 388 So. 2d 900 (Ala. 1980) (Where defendant reasonably
removed groundwater from a quarry, causing land under plaintiffs' houses to sink, the
American "reasonable use" rule would not be applied to insulate defendant's conduct. De-
fendant's liability instead was measured by principles of nuisance law.).
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fer of water upon which the pipeline depends, should adjoining landown-
ers be injured. In the event of litigation, it is difficult to predict which
rule the court will adopt. Yet, the application of the American rule clearly
could impede the successful operation of the pipeline.
B. The Groundwater Act of 1973
The Groundwater Act of 1973187 could also impact upon the pipeline.
This Act empowers the State Water Control Board to declare an area a
"groundwater management area" when resources are seriously depleted or
threatened. When an area is so designated, a permit system of water allo-
cation is established.16
8
Under the system, priority is given to domestic and agricultural con-
sumption, as well as to single commercial purposes using fifty thousand
gallons or less each day. No permits are required for these uses.169 Al-
though the rights of those already applying groundwater to beneficial uses
will be preserved, their permits will limit extraction to the amount with-
drawn on the day of declaration or on any day two years before. 170
Groundwater resources in southwest Virginia are not abundant. If the
area is deemed a water management area, permit requirements could im-
pact pipeline water supplies. If pipeline needs increase, or if preferred
uses restrict the resources available for pipeline use, groundwater would
become a nonviable source of water supply.
VI. PROPOSED LEGISLATION AND THE "TAKING" ISSUE
A. Proposed Legislation
Common law obstacles should be surmounted before the coal slurry
pipeline is implemented. However, recent proposed pipeline legislation
does nothing to resolve potential conflicts over water supply. The Virginia
Coal Pipeline Act,17 ' offered in January 1983, would have compelled pipe-
line operators to comply with existing laws governing the transfer, use,
and discharge of water. 172 Pipeline water supplies might be secured by
granting pipeline certificate holders the exercise of eminent domain over
water rights. However, the Pipeline Act provided only for the exercise of
eminent domain over private rights in land. This proposal also specifically
denied a certificate holder the right to acquire, by eminent domain, "any
167. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-44.83 to -44.107 (Repl. Vol. 1982).
168. Id. § 62.1-44.95.
169. Id. § 62.1-44.87.
170. Id. § 62.1-44.93.
171. H.B. 262, 1983 Va. Gen. Assem. §§ 56-531 to -545. (withdrawn in committee).
172. Id. §§ 56-534, -539.
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right to take, use, or develop water resources.""'
Other legislation, not specifically related to pipeline implementation,
has been proposed which would remove obstacles posed by common law
water rights. The Interbasin Transfer Act, 174 offered to the Virginia
House of Delegates in 1982, would have empowered the State Water Con-
trol Board to grant permits for interbasin transfers of water. In addition,
the State Water Control Board approved a draft Water Code17 for con-
sideration by the General Assembly which proposed alterations in water
resource allocation. These changes included legal authorization for in-
terbasin transfers176 and a permit system for surface and groundwater al-
location.27 Both the draft Code and Interbasin Transfer Act were with-
drawn from consideration in committee. 17
The General Assembly established a joint subcommittee in 1982 to con-
sider the desirability of allowing the development of coal slurry pipelines
in Virginia.179 Legislation was introduced, but not passed, in 1984 to au-
thorize coal slurry pipelines,8 0 but the legislation failed to address water
allocation issues or the removal of restrictions against interbasin transfers
of water.'8 '
Certainly the Commonwealth has the right to modify or reject common
law riparian rights when they are "unsuited to the conditions of the
state."' 2 However, such modification of state law requires recognition of
vested water rights.' The uncertainty of the state's power to impair
173. Id. § 56-537. Interests in water, as well as in land, are subject to the law of eminent
domain. See, e.g., Jeter v. Vinton-Roanoke Water Co., 114 Va. 769, 76 S.E. 921 (1913); See
also Clear Creek Water Co. v. Gladeville Improvement Co., 107 Va. 278, 58 S.E. 586 (1907)
(holding that an upstream public service water company may condemn and divert a running
stream for its own purposes, subject to just compensation of downstream riparian users).
174. H.B. 503, 1982 Va. Gen. Assem. §§ 62.1-197 to -207.
175. VIRGINIA WATER RESOURCES RESEARCH CENTER, A WATER CODE FOR VIRGINIA (1980)
[hereinafter cited as WATER CODE]. The State Water Study Commission offered the draft for
general study to the General Assembly. The draft provided three alternative codes: Alterna-
tives A, B, and C. Alternative C, entitled the Virginia Water Law, was introduced separately
by Delegate McClannan as H.B. 1420, 1981 Va. Gen. Assem. §§ 62.2-1 to -116.
176. H.B. 1420, 1981 Va. Gen. Assem. § 62.2-40.
177. Id. §§ 62.2-36 to -53.
178. 1981 HOUSE JOURNAL 1290; 1982 HOUSE JOURNAL 1617.
179. H.J. Res. 117, 1982 Va. Acts 1296.
180. H.B. 479, 1984 Va. Gen. Assem.
181. See, e.g., 0. Yucel, supra note 4, at 46.
182. Baumann v. Smrha, 145 F. Supp. 617, 624 (D. Kan. 1956), aff'd per curiam, 352 U.S.
863 (1956) (holding that the state could modify or reject the riparian doctrine and put in its
place the doctrine of prior appropriation and application to beneficial use, so long as water
rights of landowners acquired before the Act were recognized and protected). See also
Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 441 F. Supp. 559, 584 (D. Haw#ii 1977) (A state may change property
laws relating to riparian rights of land owners but has a concomitant obligation to compen-
sate landowners whose property is taken thereby.).
183. Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 441 F. Supp. 559 (D. Hawaii 1977).
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these rights without "just compensation" accounts for much of the oppo-
sition to these measures.1 8 4
B. Impairment of Riparian Rights
Authors of the draft Water Code relied upon the "public trust doc-
trine"""' in justifying the proposals. According to this doctrine, the state
owns the water within its boundaries and holds it in trust for the public,
who " have a right to have the waters protected for their use." 8 Even if
Virginia has adopted the public trust doctrine,1 87 state ownership of navi-
gable waters is insufficient justification for the abrogation of vested water
rights.
Riparian rights do not arise from ownership of the water but from the
usufructuary right to extract it.188 Admittedly, riparian rights are
subordinate to the state and federal governments' rights to improve navi-
gation.18 9 Barring this limitation, however, riparian rights apply equally
to navigable and non-navigable streams. 90 Virginia courts long ago recon-
ciled the co-existence of riparian rights and state ownership of navigable
waters. 9 1
184. See G. BALmES, supra note 145, at 14. See also U.S. CONST. amend. V; VA. CONST.
art. I, § 11.
185. See 1 WATER CODE, supra note 175, at 1. For a detailed history of the public trust
doctrine, see 2 WATER CODE, supra note 175, at E-3.
186. 1 WATER CODE, supra note 175 at 1.
187. Virginia's position on the public trust doctrine is not at all clear. The Virginia Con-
stitution states: "The natural oyster beds, rocks and shoals in the waters of the Common-
wealth shall not be leased, rented, or sold but shall be held in trust for the benefit of the
Commonwealth. ... ." VA. CONST. art. XI, § 3. An expansive reading of this section may lead
to the conclusion that all natural resources are held in trust. For commentary on this de-
bate, see 2 WATER CODE, supra note 175, at E-25 to E-27. See also Bradford v. Nature
Conservancy, 224 Va. 181, 294 S.E.2d 886 (1982) (stating that title to certain beaches and
marshlands on the Eastern Shore of Virginia is vested in the State, subject to the public's
right to use the lands for hunting, fishing, and fowling); Darling v. City of Newport News,
123 Va. 14, 96 S.E. 307 (1918), aff'd, 249 U.S. 540 (1919) (stating that the state owns and
controls the waters and beds of navigable salt waters for the use and benefit of the public).
188. See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
189. The navigational servitude derives from the constitutional power to regulate com-
merce. "The owner's use of property riparian to a navigable stream long has been limited by
the right of the public to use the stream in the interest of navigation." United States v.
Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799, 808 (1950). See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444
U.S. 164 (1979); United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956).
190. The riparian proprietor's rights in a navigable stream include: (1) access to the navi-
gable portion of the stream (including the right to build a wharf or pier subject to state
regulation), (2) the right to accretions or to alluvium, and (3) "the right to make reasonable
use of the water as it flows past or leaves the land." Taylor v. Commonwealth, 102 Va. 759,
773, 47 S.E. 875, 880-81 (1904). However, these rights are subordinate to the government's
authority over navigation. Id. at 766, 47 S.E. at 878. See also 1972 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 79
(stating that riparian doctrine applies to navigable as well as non-navigable streams).
191. "[T]he navigable waters and the soil under them within the territorial litrits of a
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It is arguable that water allocation legislation is a valid exercise of the
state's regulatory power 92 which would not require compensation for im-
paired riparian rights. Article XI of the Virginia Constitution states: "[I]t
shall be the Commonwealth's policy to protect its atmosphere, lands, and
waters from pollution, impairment or destruction, for the benefit, enjoy-
ment, and general welfare of the people of the Commonwealth.M
93
Moreover, legislation is already in effect which impairs riparian rights.
At common law, an upper riparian owner could pollute the water to the
extent that he did not "substantially impair its value for the ordinary
purposes of life. 194 The State Water Control Law, 95 however, abrogates
this right to degrade water quality and requires that all water uses which
pollute (or may pollute) state waters be approved by the State Water
Control Board.9 -The Supreme Court of Virginia has held that this abro-
gation of a common law right is a valid exercise of the state's regulatory
power and does not effect a taking.197 The State Water Control Law, how-
ever, does not impose severe restrictions on riparian rights. Although the
law regulates pollution standards and approves purification techniques,198
it does not "disturb the owner in the control or use of his property for
lawful purposes, nor restrict his right to dispose of it.'",", Rather, it stipu-
lates that present and anticipated use of waters will be preserved and
protected.200 Therefore, the constitutionality of the State Water Control
Law does not set precedence for more severe impairments of riparian
rights.201
state, are the property of the state, to be controlled by the state, in its own discretion for
the benefit of the people of the state. . . ." Taylor, 102 Va. at 770, 47 S.E. at 879. But the
riparian owner "is certainly entitled to the rights of... [one] whose land is bounded by a
navigable stream.. . ." Id. at 771, 47 S.E. at 880 (quoting Yates v. City of Milwaukee, 77
U.S. 497, 504 (1870)). See also Oliver v. City of Richmond, 165 Va. 538, 178 S.E. 48 (1936);
Darling v. City of Newport News, 123 Va. 14, 96 S.E. 307 (1918).
192. For a detailed discussion of the state's regulatory power, see Sax, Takings and the
Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964).
193. VA. CONST. art. XI, § 1 (1971).
194. Panther Coal Co. v. Looney, 185 Va. 758, 764, 40 S.E.2d 298, 301 (1946) (quoting 1
H. WOOD, NuS ANCES § 427 (3d ed. 1881), quoted in Trevett v. Prison Ass'n of Va., 98 Va.
332, 336, 36 S.E. 373, 376 (1900)). See also Shoffner v. Sutherland, 111 Va. 298, 68 S.E. 996
(1910).
195. VA. COnE ANN. §§ 62.1-44.2 to -44.34:7 (Repl. Vol. 1982).
196. Id. §§ 62.1-44.4, -44.5.
197. Commonwealth ex rel State Water Control Bd. v. County Utils., 223 Va. 534, 542,
290 S.E.2d 867, 872 (1982).
198. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-44.15 to -44.17 (Repl. Vol. 1982).
199. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 669 (1887).
200. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.4 (Repl. Vol 1982).
201. The State Conservation of Water Resources Act empowers the State Water Control
Board to plan, develop, conserve, and utilize Virgini)'s water resources. VA. CODE ANN. §§
62.1-44.35 to -44.44 (Repl. VoL 1982). Yet, it warns that nothing in the chapter "shall be
construed as altering, or as authorizing any alteration of, any existing riparian rights or
other vested rights in water or water use." Id. § 62.1-44.44(b).
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Certainly riparian rights enjoy a legally protected status. Over the
years, the Supreme Court of Virginia has upheld the riparian doctrine
and thwarted attempts by local governments to impair riparian rights
without just compensation. 20 2 The impact of the proposed coal slurry
pipeline legislation on these judicially recognized rights remains to be
considered.
Only a reviewing court can determine whether legislation rises to the
level of a taking. The court must consider: (1) the legal recognition of the
property right claimed;20 3 (2) the economic impact of the regulation on
the claimant, "particularly the extent to which the regulation has inter-
fered with distinct investment-backed expectations;"2 0 and (3) the char-
acter of the governmental action.
20 5
Generally a statute which merely diminishes the value of property
rights will not be considered a "taking. ' 20 8 The Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia has held that "no taking occurs ... unless the regulation interferes
with all reasonable beneficial uses of the property taken as a whole. '20 7 A
water permit system could be implemented and an interbasin transfer al-
lowed without total destruction of the value of the riparian land itself.
However, when considering the constitutionality of measures impairing
riparian rights, it is important to recall that riparian rights are alienable
and severable. 20 8 They not only enhance the value of riparian land but
enjoy a legally recognized status of their own.20 1 Therefore any legislation
must be examined in light of the injury to the usufruct itself.
A permit system of water allocation which re-orders rights to use of
202. See Town of Purcellville v. Potts, 179 Va. 514, 19 S.E.2d 700 (1942); Hite v. Town of
Luray, 175 Va. 218, 8 S.E.2d 369 (1940); Taylor v. Commonwealth, 102 Va. 759, 47 S.E. 875
(1904).
203. Economic interests must be legally protected proprietary interests if they are to be
protected by the Constitution. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,
125 (1978); United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 505 (1945). The nature
and extent of property rights are determined by state judicial decisions and statutes. See
Fox River Paper Co. v. Railroad Comm'n of Wis., 274 U.S. 651, 655 (1927). See also Reedy
v. Mullins, 456 F. Supp. 955, 957 (W.D. Va. 1978) (holding that municipal fire protection is
not a property right); Kohler v. Hirst, 460 F. Supp. 412, 415 (E.D. Va. 1978) (holding that
state law governs whether city government constitutes a property interest).
204. Penn Cent. 438 U.S. at 124.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 131.
207. Commonwealth ex rel. State Water Control Bd. v. County Utils., 223 Va. at 534, 290
S.E.2d at 892 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)).
208. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
209. Each riparian proprietor owns an interest in the power furnished by a stream flowing
through or by his land. See Rankin v. Town of Harrisonburg, 104 Va. 524, 52 S.E. 555
(1905). "It has long been assumed, and specifically recognized in Virginia that riparian
rights may be severed from the land to which they are appurtenant and dealt with separate
and apart therefrom." Thurston v. City of Portsmouth, 205 Va. 909, 912, 140 S.E.2d 678,
680 (1965).
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surface water may be more than mere regulation. Such a measure could
destroy the riparian owner's control or use of the usufruct as well as his
right to dispose of it.21 0 The denial of a permit to continue existing ripa-
rian uses could destroy the distinct investment-backed expectations of
the proprietor. Similarly, if an interbasin transfer severely limits the
water available for existing riparian uses, the authorizing legislation could
effect the "complete destruction" of the usufruct.2 '
It is impossible to predict the outcome of litigation on this issue. The
United States Supreme Court has failed to lay down a clear principle in
this area, acknowledging only "that 'no rigid rules' or 'set formula[s]' are
available to determine where regulation ends and taking begins."11 2 How-
ever, in view of the consistent protection provided riparian rights by Vir-
ginia courts, severe alterations of the riparian interests are likely to re-
quire compensation.
C. Impairment of Common Law Groundwater Rights
A re-structuring of groundwater rights by a comprehensive permit sys-
tem is less likely to constitute a taking. Like surface water riparian rights,
common law rights in groundwater are usufructuary.2 3 Unlike riparian
rights, they are not well-defined and established.214 There is no indication
that groundwater rights are alienable or severable or that the usufruct
itself enjoys a legally recognized status.2 15 The landowner, like other over-
lying proprietors, may capture as much water as he likes, but he has no
legal remedy against a neighbor who exhausts common supplies. 18 Unlike
the riparian proprietor who owns an interest in the power of a stream, the
landowner has no proprietary interest in the size and quantity of underly-
ing resources.
Limited case law suggests that the subterranean water is merely a part
of the surrounding soil, unless the water is shown to be "flowing in de-
210. See Mugler, 123 U.S. at 667-68.
211. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414-15 (1922) (holding that min-
ing regulations amounted to a "taking" since they made the mining of certain coal commer-
cially impracticable and thus virtually destroyed the reserved right to mine it).
212. Sax, supra note 192, at 37 (quoting United States v. Caltex, Inc., 344 U.S. 149, 156
(1952) and Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962)).
213. Woodsum v. Township of Pemberton, 172 N.J. Super 489, -, 412 A.2d 1064,
1075 (1980).
214. Miller v. Black Rock Springs Improvement Co., 99 Va. 747, 755, 40 S.E. 27, 30
(1901).
215. "As no correlative rights exist between proprietors of adjacent lands with respect to
percolating waters, the doctrine ... which presupposes the existence of a legal right which
can be injuriously affected, has no application in the determination of the right to use such
waters." Couch v. Clinchfield Coal Corp., 148 Va. 455, 462, 139 S.E. 314, 315 (1927) (quoting
Acton v. Blundell, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (1843)).
216. See supra notes 159-62 and accompanying text.
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fined or known channels. 2 17 Consequently, the right to extract ground-
water is only a part of the right to use the land. Therefore, regulatory
legislation abrogating groundwater rights would be examined only in light
of its effect on the value of the overlying property.21 If the land remains
useful for some purpose without access to the groundwater, the legislation
is not likely to be considered a "taking." A permit system of water alloca-
tion would only restrict a landowner's use of his property; it would not
deprive the land of all beneficial uses. In the future, courts may expand or
clarify groundwater rights. In view of existing common law, a permit sys-
tem of groundwater allocation probably would be a valid exercise of the
state's regulatory power.
VII. CONCLUSION
As the Virginia General Assembly faces the question of whether to au-
thorize coal slurry pipeline construction, the issues of eminent domain
and water allocation must be resolved. Eminent domain is a power not
lightly exercised. The public use requirement is a means of balancing fun-
damental beliefs in the inherent primacy of private property rights2 9
against evolving conceptions of public benefit. From mill dams to power
plants, each new wave of industrial technology has mandated a reassess-
ment of the public use requirement. The existing standard appears to lib-
erally interpret public use as synonomous with public benefit. Whether
coal slurry pipelines meet that standard can best be determined by objec-
tive analysis of advantages and disadvantages on a site-specific, case by
case basis. The guidelines set out in Virginia case law offer one ap-
proach. 220 If coal slurry pipelines pass the public use test, then slurry
pipeline companies should be given the power of eminent domain. Since
it appears railroads will persist in refusing to share their rights of way,
failure to grant eminent domain to slurry companies will delay, if not pre-
clude, the development of an alternative coal transportation system.
The common law in Virginia governing water allocation will also pose
obstacles to the successful implementation of a coal slurry pipeline. Pipe-
line proponents have correctly stressed the need for comprehensive
changes in water resource allocation and the removal of restrictions
217. Miller, 99 Va. at 754, 40 S.E. at 30.
218. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978) (stating
that the Court focuses on the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole).
219. Fallsburg & Co. v. Alexander, 101 Va. 98, 101, 43 S.E. 194, 195-96 (1903).
220. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. An analogous approach has been sug-
gested by a recent law review comment. The approach considers five factors in assessing
public use: (1) government goals to be accomplished by the taking; (2) community interest
in existing use; (3) community interest in proposed use; (4) condemner's role in initiating
the taking; and (5) condemnee's interest. Comment, Public Use, Private Use, and Judicial
Review in Eminent Domain, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 409, 445-55 (1983).
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against interbasin transfers of water. However, the prospects for far-
reaching changes in present water law are not promising. Older judicial
decisions and recent water legislation warn against impairment of private
water rights. Legislative proposals which would have adversely affected
these rights have not been well received. The spectre of the "taking" issue
discourages abrogation of common law doctrines. As the General Assem-
bly studies the feasibility of pipeline proposals, members should address
the problems posed to water supply by existing laws governing water allo-
cation. Any future pipeline legislation must provide solutions to the
problems posed by the common law.
Mary Kathleen Martin
Laurie L. Riddles

